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1B i o g r a p h i a
Francis Ysidro Edgeworth (1845-1926) was born in Edgeworthstown in County
Longford, Ireland. The background into which he was born was dominated
by the ‘larger than life’ ﬁgure of his grandfather Richard Lovell Edgeworth
(1744-1817), whose life was documented in a two-volume memoir (1820)
by his oldest daughter, the famous novelist Maria Edgeworth (1767-1849).1
Richard Lovell’s many scientiﬁc and mechanical experiments were helped by
his strong association with the Lunar Society of Birmingham, whose members
included Watt, Bolton, Wedgwood, Priestley, Darwin, and Galton. In ad-
dition, Maria’s scientiﬁc acquaintances also included Davy, Humboldt, Her-
schel, Babbage, Hooker and Faraday. The marriage of F. Y. Edgeworth’s
cousin Harriet Jessie Edgeworth (daughter of Richard Lovell’s seventh and
youngest son Michael Pakenham, 1812-81) to Arthur Gray Butler provided
links with another large and eminent academic family. These connections ex-
tend even further since A. G. Butler’s sister, Louisa Butler, married Francis
Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin.
Richard Lovell’s sixth son, and seventeenth surviving child, was Francis
Beaufort Edgeworth (1809-46), who met his wife, Rosa Florentina Eroles, the
daughter of a Spanish refugee from Catalonia and then aged sixteen, while on
the way to Germany to study philosophy; they married within three weeks
∗This is a forthcoming entry for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics.I a m
grateful to Denis O’Brien and Steven Durlauf for comments on an earlier draft.
1On the family background, see also Butler and Butler (1927). For a full-length treat-
ment of Edgeworth’s work, see Creedy (1986).
1in 1831. F. Y. Edgeworth was their ﬁfth son. With his family background
and his knowledge of French, German, Spanish and Italian, Edgeworth had
wide international sympathies.
Edgeworth was educated by tutors in Edgeworthstown until the age of 17,
when in 1862 he entered Trinity College Dublin to study languages. In 1867
Edgeworth entered Exeter College, Oxford, but after one term transferred to
Magdalen Hall. He transferred to Balliol in 1868, where in Michaelmas 1869
he obtained a ﬁrst in Literae Humaniares. He was called to the bar in 1877,
t h es a m ey e a ri nw h i c hh i sﬁrst book, New and Old Methods of Ethics,w a s
published. Edgeworth applied unsuccessfully for a Professorship of Greek
at Bedford College, London, in 1875, but later lectured there on English
language and literature for a brief period from late 1877 to mid 1878. He
had earlier lectured on logic, mental and moral sciences and metaphysics to
prospective Indian civil servants, at a private institution run by a Mr Walter
Wren. In 1880 he applied for a chair of philosophy, also unsuccessfully, but
began lecturing on logic to evening classes at King’s College London. Soon
after the publication of his second book, Mathematical Psychics, in 1881, he
applied for a professorship of logic, mental and moral philosophy and political
economy at Liverpool. Testimonials for two of Edgeworth’s applications were
given by Jevons (see Black, 1977c, pp. 98, 145) and Marshall.
Edgeworth had to wait until 1890 until he obtained a professorial ap-
pointment: this was at King’s College London, where he succeeded Thorold
Rogers in the Tooke Chair of Economic Science and Statistics. In the next
year, 1891, he again succeeded Rogers, this time to become Drummond Pro-
fessor and Fellow of All Souls’ College, Oxford, a position he held until his
retirement in 1922. Edgeworth therefore ﬁnally settled in Oxford at the age
of 46 in what was to become one of the most illustrious British chairs in
e c o n o m i c s . A tt h es a m et i m eh eb e c a m et h eﬁrst editor of the Economic
Journal.2 After a tremendously creative period of the late 1870s and 1880s,
Edgeworth had become ﬁrmly established as the leading economist, after
2He was editor or co-editor from its ﬁrst issue until his death. He was supported by
Henry Higgs from 1892 to 1905 (when the latter became the Prime Minister’s Private
Secretary), with further assistance provided at a later stage by Alfred Hoare. Keynes was
a co-editor for 15 years.
2Marshall, in Britain.
In addition to his work in economics, Edgeworth began a series of sta-
tistical papers in 1883, and was secretary to the British Association Report
on Index Numbers (1887, 1888, 1889). He was President of section F of the
British Association in 1889, a position he held again in 1922. Edgeworth’s
work on mathematical statistics took an increasingly important role. Indeed,
of about 170 papers which he published, approximately three-quarters were
concerned with statistical theory. He became a Guy Medalist (Gold) of the
Royal Statistical Society in 1907 and was President of the Society during
1912-14. His main contributions to statistics concern work on inference and
the law of error’, the correlation coeﬃcient, transformations (what he called
‘methods of translation’), and the ‘Edgeworth expansion’. The latter, a series
expansion which provides an alternative to the Pearson family of distribu-
tions, has been widely used (particularly since the work of Sargan, 1976) to
improve on the central limit theorem in approximating sampling distribu-
tions.3 His third and ﬁnal book was Metretike: or the Method of Measuring
Probability and Utility (1887). These contributions are not examined here;
see Bowley (1928) and Stigler (1978).
2 Approach to Economics
A dominant characteristic of Edgeworth’s approach to economics is that it
is mathematical, characterised by an original use of techniques, although he
does not appear to have received a formal training in mathematics. However,
he came to economics from moral philosophy. The central question of distrib-
utive justice, rather than simply the application of mathematics, dominated
his attitude towards economics. His main argument was that mathematics
provided powerful assistance to ‘unaided’ reason, and could check the con-
clusions reached by other methods. Thus:
He that will not verify his conclusions as far as possible by
3It has also been used to provide support for the bootstrap in providing an Edgeworth
correction. Edgeworth’s work in probability and statistics has been collected by McCann
(ed.) (1996).
3mathematics, as it were bringing the ingots of common sense to
be assayed and coined at the mint of the sovereign science, will
h a r d l yr e a l i s et h ef u l lv a l u eo fw h a th eh o l d s ,w i l lw a n tam e a s u r e
of what it will be worth in however slightly altered circumstances,
a means of conveying and making it current. (1881, p.3)
Edgeworth’s approach contrasting sharply with Marshall, who commented
to Bowley that ‘Edgeworth might have done something great at it [eco-
nomics]: but he has crushed his instincts between the cog wheels of his
mathematical machinery’. The contrast between Edgeworth and Marshall
was neatly summarized by Pigou as follows:
During some thirty years until their recent deaths in honoured
age, the two outstanding names in English economics were Mar-
shall ... and Edgeworth ... Edgeworth, the tool-maker, gloried
in his tools ... Marshall, on the other hand, had what almost
amounted to an obsession for hiding his tools away. (Pigou and
Robertson, 1931, p.3)
Although both men turned to economics from mathematics and moral
philosophy, Marshall generally used biological analogies, and was concerned
with developing maxims. In contrast Edgeworth generally used mechanical
analogies, and was more concerned with developing theorems.
In the 1880s and 1890s the deductive method encountered a great deal of
criticism, especially from the ‘historical school’ of economists. Edgeworth’s
defence of the deductive method often involved showing how other economists
had advocated its use. His interest in the natural sciences often led him
to make comparisons with scientiﬁc laws, and especially to show that the
physical sciences also relied on abstraction and approximation.
Edgeworth argued carefully that the assumptions used in economics are
often untestable, and he therefore took precautions against the accusation
of ‘plucking assumptions from the air’. He was conscious of the fact that
the diﬃculty is in making the crucial abstractions which make the particular
problem under consideration tractable, but which are not question begging.
4His attitude to many a priori assumptions was directly related to his approach
to statistical inference. In Mathematical Psychics, for example, he referred
to ‘the ﬁrst principle of probabilities, according to which cases about which
we are equally undecided ... count as equal’ (1881, p.99). This was then
transferred to economics. The appropriate assumption was that all feasi-
ble values, say of elasticities, were equally likely, until evidence is obtained.
Hence, ‘There is required, I think ... in order to override the a priori probabil-
ity, either very deﬁnite speciﬁc evidence, or the concensus of high authorities’
(1925, p.391). This also illustrates Edgeworth’s attitude to authority and his
many allusions to the views of other leading economists. Price (1946, p.38)
refered to his frequent ‘reference to authority for ... support of tentative
opinion waveringly advanced’.
Edgeworth was also prone to stress negative results. For example, in
discussing taxation, where the criterion of minimum sacriﬁce does not alone
provide a simple tax formula. He stated:
Yet the premises, however inadequate to the deduction of a
deﬁnite formula, may suﬃce for a certain negative conclusion.
The ground which will not serve as the foundation of the elaborate
ediﬁce designed may yet be solid enough to support a battering-
ram capable of being directed against simpler ediﬁces in the neigh-
bourhood. (1925, p.261)
Edgeworth’s position as editor of the enabled him to combine both his
critical attitude and his appetite for a wide range of reading. He contributed
32 book reviews, and in sending books to other reviewers he would include
‘apposite remarks on particular points in the text’ (Bowley, 1934, p.123).
These reviews should also be placed beside his 17 reviews in the Academy,
and 131 articles in the original Palgrave’s Dictionary of Economics.F u r t h e r -
more, Edgeworth’s later articles in the Economic Journal, such as those on
international trade and on taxation, took the form of extended commentaries
on contemporary work.
53 Early Work in Moral Philosophy
Before turning to economics, Edgeworth published a brief note in Mind in
1876, and his ﬁrst (privately printed) book on New and Old Methods of Ethics
in 1877. The description by Keynes of Edgeworth’s ﬁrst book could just as
well be applied to his other two books:
Edgeworth’s peculiarities of style, his brilliance of phrasing,
his obscurity of connection, his inconclusiveness of aim, his rest-
lessness of direction, his courtesy, his caution, his shrewdness, his
wit, his subtlety, his learning, his reserve - all are there full-grown.
Quotations from the Greek tread on the heels of the diﬀerential
calculus. (Keynes, 1972, p.257)
The main focus of this early work, strongly inﬂuenced by the great Cam-
bridge philosopher Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), was to examine in detail the
implications of utilitarianism for the optimal distribution of resources. Edge-
worth’s special and original contribution was to apply advanced mathematics
to this problem. Edgeworth’s approach was dominated by his utilitarianism,
but the inﬂuence of contemporary psychological research and the impact of
evolutionary ideas can also be traced. Both aspects led to explicit consider-
ation of diﬀerences between individuals and changes which take place over
time.
Edgeworth was also inﬂuenced by the major ﬁerce debates in the last
half of the nineteenth century between egoism, evolutionism, idealism, intu-
itionism, and of course utilitarianism. His brand of utilitarianism became
extremely eclectic, and embraced the majority of the above principles (ex-
cept for those of the Hegelian idealists) while regarding utilitarianism as the
‘sovereign principle’. His note in Mind discussed Matthew Arnold’s views of
Joseph Butler, who had examined egoist at great length. Arnold had argued
that Butler’s term ‘self love’ should be interpreted to mean ‘the pursuit of
our temporal good’. However, Edgeworth argued that egoism and utilitari-
anism could be subsumed under the same principle. He believed Butler to
be saying, ‘duty and interest are perfectly coincident; for the most part in
6this world, but entirely and in every instance, if we take in the future and
the whole’ (1876, p.571).
Edgeworth generally distinguised between ‘impure’ and ‘pure’ utilitari-
anism. In the latter case individuals are assumed to be concerned with the
welfare of society as a whole. The former case in fact corresponds more
closely with a ‘short term’ version of egoism. Economic exchange can use-
fully be analysed in terms of ‘jostling egoists’, but he believed that ultimately
individuals would evolve to become pure utilitarians. A reason for believing
that individuals would make such a transition was later to be developed by
Edgeworth in the form of his contractarian justiﬁcation of utilitarianism as
the appropriate principle of distributive justice.
Edgeworth’s early utilitarianism was inﬂuenced by his wide knowledge
of work in experimental psychology. In his books of 1877 and 1881 there
are many references to the work of Delboeuf, Fechner, Helmholtz, Weber
and Wundt. These references occur in the context of discussing the nature
of utility functions and, although Edgeworth at this time was not aware of
the earlier work of Jevons, the same range of psychological work was also
important to Jevons. Edgeworth in 1877 explicitly suggested, in connection
with Fechner, that an additive form would not be appropriate.
A further aspect of Edgeworth’s utilitarianism is his attitude towards
authority. An important issue for early utilitarians involved the nature of in-
ductive evidence about the consequences of acts. Most people cannot know
the full consequences of their acts, so that rules of moral conduct must be
followed (in contrast with intuitionism where individuals are assumed to have
immediate consciousness of moral rules). In arriving at such rules, the opin-
ions of highly regarded individuals are taken to be credible though it may
n o tb ep o s s i b l et os h o wc o n c l u s i v e l yt h a tt h e ya r e‘ c o r r e c t ’ .E d g e w o r t ha r -
gued, for example, that ‘we ought to defer even to the undemonstrated dicta
and opinions of the wise, who have a power of mental vision acquired by
experience’ (1925, ii, p.149).
Edgeworth deﬁned the problem of determining the optimal utilitarian dis-
tribution as follows: ‘given a certain quantity of stimulus to be distributed
among a given set of sentients ... to ﬁnd the law of distribution productive
7of the greatest quantity of pleasure’ (1877, p.43). In treating this problem
mathematically, Edgeworth used Lagrange multipliers, without any explana-
tion, and concluded that, ‘unto him that hath greater capacity for pleasure
shall be added more of the means of pleasure’ (1877, p.43). In using Lagrange
multipliers, Edgeworth was also careful to discuss possible complications, re-
ferring to the possibility of multiple solutions and explicitly discussing corner
solutions and inequality constraints.
Further complexities were then examined, where Edgeworth emphasize
that utilitarianism implies equality of the ‘means of pleasure’ only under a
special set of assumptions, and in the general case the prescribed solution
will be some form of inequality. In dealing with the distribution of eﬀort, he
argued not surprisingly that most work should be provided by those most
capable of providing it. In a yet more general treatment of the problem,
Edgeworth used the calculus of variations, but again provided the reader
with virtually no help in following his mathematical argument. Edgeworth’s
analysis of the utilitarian optimal distribution was continued in his paper on
‘The hedonical calculus’ (1879), which was later reprinted as the third part
of Mathematical Psychics.
4 Early Work in Economics
The turning point in Edgeworth’s work was his introduction to Jevons in 1879
by a mutual friend James Sully, who in 1878 moved to Hampstead, where
Edgeworth had lodgings in Mount Vernon and where Jevons also lived; see
Sully (1918, pp. 180, 223). His ﬁrst knowledge of Marshall came from Jevons
who, ‘highly praised the then recently published Economics of Industry’ (in
Pigou, ed, 1925b, p.66). Edgeworth became interested in the problem of the
indeterminacy of the rate of exchange, arising from the existence of only a
small number of transactors. This led rapidly to Edgeworth’s second and
most important book Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application
of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences (1881), which was clearly written in a
state of considerable enthusiasm for his new subject. This slim volume of 150
pages was known only to a small group of experts. Marshall’s review began,
8‘this book shows clear signs of genius, and is a promise of great things to
come’ (Whitaker, ed, 1975, p.265). Jevons began by stating that ‘whatever
else readers of this book may think about it, they would probably all agree
that it is a very remarkable one’ (1881, p.581). It was not until the middle
of the 20th century that many of its central ideas began to be more fully
appreciated.
Part 1 of Mathematical Psychics (1881, pp. 1-15) was devoted mainly to
aj u s t i ﬁcation of the use of mathematics in economics where precise data are
not available. There is probably no other ‘apology’ in the whole of economic
literature which compares with Edgeworth’s plea for the application of math-
ematics. For example, when considering individual utility maximization:
Atoms of pleasure are not easy to distinguish and discern;
more continuous than sand, more discrete than liquid; as it were
nuclei of the just-perceivable, embedded in circumambient semi-
consciousness. We cannot count the golden sands of life; we can-
n o tn u m b e rt h e‘ i n n u m e r a b l es m i l e ’o fs e a so fl o v e ;b u tw es e e m
to be capable of observing that there is here a greater, there a
less, multitude of pleasure-units; mass of happiness; and that is
enough. (1881, pp. 8-9)
Great stress was placed on comparison with Lagrange’s ‘Principle of least
action’ in examining the overall eﬀects produced by the interactions among
many particles. The connection with Edgeworth’s analysis of competition,
involving interaction among a large number of competitors to produce a
determinate rate of exchange, is central here. The fact that in the natural
sciences so much could be derived from a single principle was important for
both Jevons and Edgeworth. But Edgeworth took this to its ultimate limit
in arguing that the comparable single principle in social sciences, that of
maximum utility, would produce results of comparable value. Referring to
Laplace’s massive work, Mecanique Celeste,h es u g g e s t e dt h a t :
‘Mécanique Sociale’ may one day take her place along with
‘Mécanique Celeste’, throned each upon the double-sided height
9of one maximum principle, the supreme pinnacle of moral as of
physical science . . . the movements of each soul, whether self-
ishly isolated or linked sympathetically, may continually be re-
alising the maximum energy of pleasure, the Divine love of the
universe. (1881, p.12)
Jevons’s work in the Theory of Political Economy involved the application
of very basic mathematics, and of psychological research, to the analysis
of exchange in competitive markets. In addition to this direct stimulus,
Edgeworth was also inﬂuenced by an anonymous review of Jevons’s book in
the Saturday Review (1871).
The crucial development following Edgeworth’s contact with Jevons was
not simply the realization that mathematics could be used to examine equi-
librium in exchange. Rather it was that in his analysis Jevons explicitly
assumed, through his ‘law of indiﬀerence’, that all individuals take the equi-
librium prices as given, that is outside their control. In using this law as ‘one
of the central pivots of the theory’, Jevons stated that, ‘there can only be one
ratio of exchange of one uniform commodity at any moment’ (1957, p.87).
His theory was explicitly limited to the static equilibrium conditions. He
deliberately excluded the role of the number of competitors from his analysis
via the awkward notion of the ‘trading body’, following correspondence with
Fleeming Jenkin (1833-85), who raised the question of indeterminacy with
just two traders; see Black (1977a, pp. 166-78). Jenkin could not see why
two isolated individuals should accept the price-taking equilibrium, whereas
Jevons wished to consider the behaviour of two typical individuals in a large
market.
In a section on ‘Failure of the Laws of Exchange’, Jevons discussed cases
in which some indeterminacy would result. His most notable example was of
house sales, where it was suggested that indeterminacy would result from the
discrete nature of the good being exchanged. The Saturday Review article
took exception to this, suggesting that indeterminacy ‘is really owing in our
opinion to the assumed absence of competition’ (see Black, 1981, p.157). The
stress on indeterminacy was also inﬂuence by Marshall’s discussion of wage
10bargaining: Edgeworth (1881, p.48, n.1) referred to Thornton’s comparison
of the determination of prices in Dutch and English auctions, and cited Alfred
and Mary Paley Marshall’s joint book on the Economics of Industry (1879).
It was this gap in Jevons’s analysis that Edgeworth set out to ﬁll. His
achievement was to show the conditions under which competition between
buyers and sellers, through a barter process, leads to a ‘ﬁnal settlement’
which is equivalent to one in which all individuals act independently as price
takers. As he later stated (1925, p.453), ‘the existence of a uniform rate of
exchange between any two commodities is perhaps not so much axiomatic as
deducible from the process of competition in a perfect market’.
5 Exchange and Contract
Having argued that, ‘the conception of Man as a pleasure machine may jus-
tify and facilitate the employment of mechanical terms and Mathematical
reasoning in social science’ (1881, p.15), Edgeworth moved on to the analysis
of the ‘economical calculus’, the starting point of which was the assumption
that, ‘every agent is actuated only by self-interest’ (1881, p.16).
In modern economic analysis the analytical tools invented by Edgeworth
in 1881, such as the indiﬀerence map and the contract curve, are now used in
a vast range of contexts. They were introduced by Edgeworth to examine the
nature of barter among individuals. He wanted to see if a determinate rate
of exchange would be likely to result in barter situations where it is assumed
only that individuals wish to maximize their own utility, considered solely
as a function of their own consumption. With full knowledge of individuals’
utility functions, and their initial endowments of goods, would it be possible
to work out a ‘determinate’ rate of exchange at which trade would take place?
Edgeworth’s direct statement of the problem is as follows:
The PROBLEM to which attention is specially directed in
this introductory summary is: How far contract is indeterminate
— an inquiry of more than theoretical importance, if it show not
only that indeterminateness tends to [be present] widely, but also
11in what direction an escape from its evils is to be sought. (1881,
p.20)
E d g e w o r t hb e g a nh i sa n a l y s i so ft h i sp r o b l e mb yt a k i n gt h es i m p l e s tc a s e
of two individuals exchanging ﬁxed quantities of two goods. The basic frame-
work is that described by Jevons, where the ﬁrst individual holds all of the
initial stocks of the ﬁrst good, the second individual holds all the stocks of
the second good. He wrote the utility functions of each individual in terms
of the amounts exchange, rather than consumed. He then immediately de-
ﬁned the general utility function (‘utility is regarded as a function of the two
variables, not the sum of two functions of each’, 1881, p.104), the contract
curve and indiﬀerence curves, in that order.
In the sentence which follows Edgeworth’s introduction of the general util-
ity function, he raised the question of the equilibrium which may be reached
with, ‘one or both refusing to move further’. In barter the conditions of
exchange must be reached by voluntary agreement, or contract, between the
two parties, and of course it is fundamental that no egoist would agree to
a contract which would make him worse oﬀ than before the exchange. The
question thus concerns the nature of the settlement reached by two contract-
ing parties. He immediately answered that contract supplies only part of
the answer so that, ‘supplementary conditions ... supplied by competition
or ethical motives’ are required, and then wrote the equation of his famous
contract curve (1881, pp. 20-1).
The problem of obtaining the equilibrium values of x and y which, ‘cannot
be varied without the consent of the parties to it’ was stated as follows:
‘It is required to ﬁnd a point (x,y) such that, in whatever direction we
take an inﬁnitely small step, [UA]a n d[ UB] do not increase together, but
that, while one increases, the other decreases’ (1881, p.21). The locus of
such points, ‘it is here proposed to call the contract-curve’. Edgeworth’s
alternative derivations of the contract curve involved the movement, from an
arbitrary position, along one person’s indiﬀerence curve; ‘motion is possible
so long as, one party not losing, the other gains’ (1881, p.23). He thus used
the Lagrange multiplier method of maximizing one person’s utility subject
12to the condition that the other person’s utility remains constant.
In the diagram drawn by Edgeworth (1881, p.28) he did not use a box
construction. Furthermore the only indiﬀerence curves shown fully were those
which each individual is able to reach in isolation, and which therefore specify
the limits beyond which each is not prepared to move. Also part of the oﬀer or
reciprocal demand curves of each individual were drawn on the same diagram,
although they were not deﬁned until ten pages later.
After presenting the results for the two-person two-good case, Edgeworth
(1881, p.26) examined the contract curve in the case where three individuals
exchange three goods, stated, that it is given by the ‘eliminant’, and then
gave three lines of three sets of partial derivatives. In fact the contract curve




¯ ¯ ¯ =0 ,w h e r e
∂Ui
∂xj, is the marginal utility
of person i with respect to good j, but Edgeworth did not use the modern
notation for determinants and did not set the Jacobian equal to zero. This
early use of determinants in economics would probably have confused many
of his readers.
5.1 The Problem of Indeterminacy
The concepts of indiﬀerence curves and the contract curve therefore help to
specify a range of ‘eﬃcient exchanges’ of goods between individuals. The
essential feature of the analysis from Edgeworth’s point of view is precisely
that there is a range, rather than a unique point: ‘the settlements are rep-
resented by an indeﬁnite number of points’ (1881, p.29). At any particular
settlement, the rate of exchange is expressed simply in terms of the amount
of one good which is given up in order to obtain a speciﬁed amount of the
other good. Hence the existence of a range of eﬃcient contracts means that
the rate of exchange is ‘indeterminate’. The rate of exchange achieved in
practice will thus depend to a large extent on bargaining strength. It was
this result which led Edgeworth to make his often quoted remark that, ‘an
accessory evil of indeterminate contract is the tendency, greater than in a
full market, towards dissimulation and objectionable arts of higgling.’ (1881,
p.30).
13Edgeworth argued that his analysis of indeterminacy in contract between
two traders could be applied to a very wide variety of contexts. In partic-
ular, the tendency of large groups to form ‘combinations’, as in the case of
trade unions and employers’ associations, would serve to increase the extent
of indeterminacy. The general applicability of his analysis of contract and
indeterminacy was summarized by Edgeworth as follows:
What it has been sought to bring clearly into view is the
essential identity (in the midst of diversity of ﬁelds and articles)
of contract; a sort of uniﬁcation likely to be distasteful to those
e x c e l l e n tp e r s o n sw h oa r ea l w a y sd i v i d i n gt h eO n ei n t ot h eM a n y ,
but do not appear very ready to subsume the Many under the
One. (1881, p.146)4
Having shown the possibilities of indeterminacy, Edgeworth then went
on to show how ‘the escape from its evils’ requires either competition or
arbitration.
6 Competition and the Number of Traders
The central question which Edgeworth was trying to resolve in the second
part of Mathematical Psychics was that of the conditions necessary to remove
the indeterminacy which exists in the case of barter between two traders.
The question naturally arises as to the extent to which this indeterminacy
i st h er e s u l to ft h ea b s e n c eo fc o m p e t i t i o ni nt h es i m p l et w o - p e r s o nm a r k e t .
E d g e w o r t ht h u sq u i c k l ym o v e do nt ot h eintroduction of further traders.
In Edgeworth’s earlier problem of two traders exchanging two goods, the
deﬁnition of a range of eﬃcient exchanges (along the contract curve) is of
course analytically separate from the question of whether or not two isolated
traders would actually reach a settlement on the contract curve. However,
these two aspects were not clearly separated by Edgeworth because at the
beginning of his analysis he introduced his stylized description of the process
4Plato’s expression ‘the one in the many’ was later used by Marshall as the motto for
his 1919 book on Industry and Trade.
14of barter: this is the famous ‘recontracting’ process. Edgeworth did not wish
to assume that individuals initially have perfect knowledge. Instead, he sup-
posed that, ‘There is free communication throughout a normal competitive
ﬁeld. You might suppose the constituent individuals collected at a point,
or connected by telephones — an ideal supposition, but suﬃciently approx-
imate to existence or tendency for the purposes of abstract science’ (1881,
p.18). The knowledge of the other traders’ dispositions and resources could
be obtained by the formation of tentative contracts which are not assumed
to involve actual transfers, and can be broken when further information is
obtained. Edgeworth introduced this in typical style:5
‘Is it peace or war?’ asks the lover of ‘Maud’, of economic
competition, and answers hastily: it is both, pax or pact between
contractors during contract, war, when some of the contractors
without the consent of others recontract. (1881, p.17)
An important role of the recontracting process is thus to disseminate
information among traders. It allows individuals who initially agree to a
contract, which is not on the contract curve, to discover that an opportunity
exists for making an improved contract according to which at least one person
gains without another suﬀering.
However, the real importance of the recontracting process lies in the fact
that it allows for Edgeworth’s analysis of the role of the number of individuals
in a market. With numerous individuals, the recontracting process makes it
possible to analyse the use of collusion among some of the traders. Individ-
uals are allowed to form coalitions in order to improve bargaining strength.
Recontracting enables the coalitions to be broken up by outsiders who may
attract members of a group away with more favourable terms of exchange.
Edgeworth’s analysis was extremely terse and the following discussion
does not therefore follow his own presentation. The analysis begins by in-
troducing a second person A and a second person B. The new traders are
assumed to be exact replicas of the initial pair, with the same tastes and
5The allusion here is to Alfred Tennyson’s poem ‘Maud; A Monodrama’, part 1, verse
VII.
15endowments. This simpliﬁcation is useful because the dimensions of the
Edgeworth box and the utility curves are identical for each pair of traders.
Hence, it enables the same diagram to be used as in the case when only two
traders are considered in isolation. Two basic points can be stated imme-
diately. First, in the ﬁnal settlement all individuals will be at a common
point in the Edgeworth box. Second, the settlement must be on the contract
curve. The ﬁrst point arises because if two individuals have identical tastes
then their total utility is maximised by sharing their resources equally. It is
useful to consider other types of contract which will eventually be broken,
in order to illustrate the way in which the introduction of additional traders
provides a role for some kind of competitive process.
The major question at issue is whether the range of indeterminacy along
the contract curve is reduced by the addition of these traders. Consider
Figure 1 and suppose that when A1 and B1 are trading independently of A2
and B2,t r a d e rB1 has all the bargaining power and is able to appropriate
all the gains from trade by pushing A1 to the limit of the contract curve at
point C. Suppose also that the same applies to A2 and B2.I ft h et w op a i r s
of traders are then able to communicate with each other, A2 can now simply
refuse to trade with B2 at C. With no transaction costs, A2 was previously
indiﬀerent between trading at C and consuming at the endowment point, E.
This endowment position is eﬀectively the ‘threat point’ of the As: it is the
position in which they would ﬁnd themselves if the bargaining process were
to break down. But A2 no longer needs to remain in isolation after refusing
to trade with B2, and instead can trade with A1, after A1 has traded with
B1 at C and has therefore obtained some of good Y. The two As can share
their stocks of X and Y equally, ariving at point P;s u c ha ne q u a ld i v i s i o n
maximises their total utility.
By reaching point P, half way between C and E, the convexity of the
indiﬀerence curves implies that they are both better oﬀ than anywhere on
the no-trade indiﬀerence curve. The two As would be on a higher common
indiﬀerence curve, and thus better-oﬀ,i ft h e yc o u l dc o n s u m ea tap o i n ta l o n g
the CPE which is to the north-west of point P. However, they do not have
enough resources to move beyond the half-way point P.
16OA good X
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Figure 1: Two Pairs of Traders
Trader B2, who has been isolated, cannot prevent such a bargain. Thus
B1 is at C,b o t hAsa r ea tP and B2 is at the initial endowment point E.I n
this situation B1 has no incentive to change, but B2 has a strong incentive
to oﬀer a better deal to one of the Ast h a nt h eo n eo ﬀered by trader B1.S o
long as B2 oﬀers one of the As, say A2, a trade on the contract curve which
allows A2 to reach a higher indiﬀerence curve than U0
A, the initial agreement
with B1 will be broken and recontracting will take place.
The implication is that the ability of the Ast ot u r nt os o m e o n ee l s e ,
rather than deal with a single trader, means that the Bs now compete against
each other. However trader B1, who cannot prevent the recontracting, has
an incentive to make yet a better oﬀer. Hence, the recontracting process
continues. The stylised process of recontracting with the two Bsc o m p e t i n g
against each other will produce a ﬁnal settlement at the point C∗ in Figure
2. This has the property that the indiﬀerence curve U000
A passes through C∗
and P∗,w h e r eP∗ is half way between C∗ and E. This means that the two
Asa r ei n d i ﬀerent between C∗ and P∗ , and since they cannot both reach any
point between C∗ and P∗ along the line C∗E, they are unable to improve on
C∗. Hence there is no need to leave one of the Bs in isolation and the two














Figure 2: The New Limit to the Contract Curve
Bs will trade with the two Asa tp o i n tC∗.
This argument has shown that at the ﬁnal settlement all traders are at
a common point on the contract curve and the limit has moved inwards
along the old contract curve. The analysis can be repeated by starting with
an alternative situation whereby the As are initially assumed to be able to
appropriate all the gains from trade. The point C0 would then no longer
qualify as a point on the new contract curve. The introduction of the addi-
tional pair of traders means that the contract curve shrinks, and the range
of indeterminacy involved in barter is correspondingly reduced.
T h ee x t e n tt ow h i c ht h ec o n t r a c tc u r ve shrinks when the additional pair
o ft r a d e r si si n t r o d u c e di si n ﬂuenced by the fact that the Asc a n n o tg e t
further than half way along a ray from a point on the contract curve to the
endowment position. However, if there are three pairs of As and three pairs
of Bs, the repetition of the above analysis involves two of the Asd e a l i n g
with two of the Bs at a point on the contract curve. The two As then share
their resources equally with the remaining A while the third B is isolated.
The As are able to consume together at a point which is two-thirds of the
way along the ray from the initial endowment position to the point on the
contract curve where the trade involving the two Asa n dt w oBs takes place.
18Figure 3: Final Settlement with Many Traders
With N pairs, the As can reach a proportion
(N−1)
N of the way from the
endowment point to the contract curve. Thus as N increases, the values of
k approaches unity. This means that the As can reach all the way from E
to the contract curve, so that the ﬁnal settlement must be such that the
indiﬀerence curve is tangential to the ray from the origin. A ﬁnal settlement
w i t hm a n yt r a d e r si st h e r e f o r es h o w ni nF i g u r e3a sp o i n tP on the contract
curve. The eﬀect of working in from the point C0 w o u l dl e a dt oa ne q u i v a l e n t
result for an indiﬀerence curve of the Bs, shown as U∗
B.
The result is that the ﬁnal settlement looks just like a price-taking equi-
librium. The ﬁgure illustrates the case where there is a single price-taking
equilibrium. If there are multiple equilibria, the recontracting process causes
the number of ﬁnal settlements, with suﬃciently large N,t os h r i n kt ot h e
number of price-taking equlibria.6 This argument relating to the shrinking
contract curve, ﬁrst established by Edgeworth, is often referred to as the
limit theorem.
After Edgeworth’s terse discussion, he stated:
6For discussion of utility functions involving multiple equilibria, and comparison of
bargaining, competitive and utilitarian solutions, see Creedy (1994a).
19If this reasoning does not seem satisfactory, it would be pos-
s i b l et og i v eam o r ef o r m a lp r o o f ;b r i n g i n go u tt h ei m p o r t a n t
result that the common tangent to both indiﬀerence curves ... is
the vector from the origin. (1881, p.38)
The price-taking solution is necessarily on the contract curve. This gives
rise to what is now referred to as the ‘ﬁrst fundamental theorem’ of welfare
economics — that a price-taking equilibrium is Pareto eﬃcient. Furthermore,
the use of price-taking provides a considerable reduction in the amount of in-
formation required by traders when compared with the recontracting process.
Given an equilibrium set, individuals only need to know the prices of goods,
whereas in the recontracting process they have to learn a considerable amount
of information about other individuals’ preferences and endowments. But
Edgeworth placed more stress on the equivalence of the competitive price-
taking solution with a recontracting barter process involving large numbers.
Given that coalitions among traders are allowed in the recontracting
process, a price-taking equilibrium cannot be blocked by a coalition of traders.
In this sense the competitive equilibrium is robust. The argument that a com-
plex process of bargaining among a large number of individuals produces a
result which replicates a price-taking equilibrium, allowing for the free ﬂow
of information using recontracting and enabling coalitions of traders to form
and break up, is an important result that is far from intuitively obvious. The
recontracting process can be said to represent a competitive process, and the
contract curve shrinks essentially because of the competition between sup-
pliers of the same good, although it is carried out in a barter framework in
which explicit prices are not used (although rates of exchange are equivalent
to price ratios).
The price-taking equilibrium, in contrast, does not actually involve a
competitive process. Individuals simply believe that they must take mar-
ket prices as given and outside their control. They respond to those prices
without any reference to other individuals. But the result is that the price-
taking equilibrium looks just like a situation in which all activity is perfectly
co-ordinated.
20Edgeworth suggested that similar results apply when some of the as-
sumptions are relaxed. Thus, ‘when we suppose plurality of natures as well
as persons, we have to suppose a plurality of contract-curves ... Then, by
considerations analogous to those already employed, it may appear that the
quantity of ﬁnal settlements is diminished as the number of competitors is
increased’ (1881, p.40). He then brieﬂyc o n s i d e r e dd i ﬀerent numbers of As
and Bs, concluding that, ‘the theorem admits of being extended to the gen-
eral case of unequal numbers and natures’ (1881, p.43). However, some of
the results do not hold in the general case; for example equality within the
group of As no longer holds when there are unequal numbers of Asa n dBs.
A considerable number of articles have been written, since the late 1950s, ex-
amining various aspects of the Edgeworth recontract model under diﬀerent
assumptions.
6.1 Reciprocal Demand Curves
It has been mentioned that Edgeworth included in his diagram (1881, p.28)
the reciprocal demand curve, or oﬀer curve, of each individual, although such
curves were then called ‘demand-and-supply curves’. Edgeworth mentioned
them only brieﬂy in the text (1881, p.39), but the lack of emphasis under-
standable, since in imperfect competition they are not relevant. Edgeworth’s
contribution was to provide the basic ‘analytics’ of the oﬀer curve in terms
of indiﬀerence curves, whereby it is ‘the locus of the point where lines from
the origin touch curves of indiﬀerence’ (1881, p.113).
When there is a lack of competition, giving rise to indeterminacy, there
is nothing to ensure that individuals will trade on their oﬀer curves and, as
Edgeworth argued, ‘the conceptions of demand and supply at a price are no
longer appropriate’ (1881, p.31). It is this general preference, in favour of the
analysis of barter in non-competitive situations, to which Marshall objected
and which led to the controversy discussed below.
217 The Utilitarian Calculus
Having shown how indeterminacy can be removed by increasing the number
of traders, Edgeworth turned to consider the role of arbitration in resolving
the conﬂict between traders, in a ‘world weary of strife’ (1881, p.51). The
principle of arbitration examined was, not surprisingly, the utilitarian princi-
ple, which Edgeworth had earlier used to examine the optimal distribution.
However, the new context of indeterminacy led him to a deeper justiﬁcation
of utilitarianism as a principle of distributive justice. Having arrived at this
new link between ‘impure’ (egoistic) and ‘pure’ utilitarianism, Edgeworth
had only to reorientate his earlier analysis of optimal distribution, contained
in his paper in Mind of 1879.
The need for arbitration with indeterminacy had been stated by Jevons
as follows:
The dispositions and force of character of the parties ... will
inﬂuence the decision. These are motives more or less extraneous
to a theory of economics, and yet they appear necessary consid-
erations in this problem. It may be that indeterminate bargains
of this kind are best arranged by an arbitrator or third party.
(1957, pp. 124-5)
Edgeworth’s statement of the same point was as usual rather less prosaic:
‘The whole creation groans and yearns, desiderating a principle of arbitration,
and end of strifes’ (1881, p.51). Edgeworth argument involved two steps.
First, he showed that the principle of utility maximisation places individuals
on the contract curve, because the ﬁrst-order conditions are equivalent to the
tangency of indiﬀerence curves.
It is a circumstance of momentous interest that one of the
in general indeﬁnitely numerous settlements between contractors
is the utilitarian arrangement ... the contract tending to the
greatest possible total utility of the contractors. (1881, p.53)
22Edgeworth recognized that this result was not suﬃcient to justify the use
of utilitarianism as a principle of arbitration. It is only a necessary condition
of a principle of arbitration that it should place the parties somewhere on
the contract curve. Edgeworth’s justiﬁcation for utilitarianism as a principle
of justice, comparing points along the contract curve, was as follows:
Now these positions lie in a reverse order of desirability for
e a c hp a r t y ;a n di tm a ys e e mt oe a c ht h a ta sh ec a n n o th a v eh i s
own way, in the absence of any deﬁnite principle of selection, he
has about as good a chance of one of the arrangements as another
... both parties may agree to commute their chance of any of the
arrangements for ... the utilitarian arrangement. (1881, p.55)
The important point to stress about this statement is that Edgeworth
clearly viewed distributive justice in terms of choice under uncertainty. He
argued that the contractors, faced with uncertainty about their prospects,
would choose to accept an arrangement along utilitarian lines. A crucial com-
ponent of this argument, also clearly stated by Edgeworth in this quotation,
is the use of equal a priori probabilities.
The importance to him of this new justiﬁcation of utilitarianism cannot be
exaggerated. Indeed the whole of Mathematical Psychics seems to be imbued
with a feeling of excitement generated by his discovery of a justiﬁcation based
on a ‘social contract’. This provided the crucial link between ‘impure’ and
‘pure’ utilitarianism in a more satisfactory way than his earlier appeal to
evolutionary forces.
Edgeworth believed that he had provided an answer to an age old ques-
tion, stating, ‘by what mechanism the force of self-love can be applied so as to
support the structure of utilitarian politics, neither Helvetius, nor Bentham,
nor any deductive egoist has made clear’ (1881, p.128). Nevertheless this
argument was neglected until re-statements along similar lines were made by
Harsanyi (1953, 1955) and Vickrey (1960). The maximization of expected
utility, with each individual taking the a priori view that any outcome is
equally likely, was shown to lead to the use of a social welfare function which
23maximizes the sum of individual utilities. This approach is now usually de-
scribed as ‘contractarian neo-utilitarianism’.
In discussing the utilitarian solution as a principle of arbitration in in-
determinate contract, Edgeworth did not clearly indicate in 1881 that the
utilitarian solution of maximum total utility could specify a position which
makes one of the parties worse oﬀ than in the no-trade situation. This was
nevertheless later made explicit when, after proposing arbitration along util-
itarian lines, he added, ‘subject to the condition that neither should lose by
the contract’ (1925, ii, p.102). This possibility of course depends largely on
the initial endowments of the individuals.
8 Later Work in Economics
After the publication of Mathematical Psychics, Edgeworth concentrated in-
creasingly on mathematical statistics, in particular on the problem of sta-
tistical inference, but following his appointment to the Drummond Chair
at Oxford, Edgeworth again made important contributions to economics al-
though this work mainly involved reactions to, and discussions arising from,
the later work of other authors.
8.1 Demand and Exchange
In the Principles of Economics (1890, Appendix F) Marshall included a
brief discussion of Edgeworth’s analysis of barter, and produced a ﬁgure
showing the contract curve. During the following year, in the course of a
review written in Italian, Edgeworth criticized Marshall for not having dealt
suﬃciently with the problem of indeterminacy. The basic problem was that
Marshall, using a model in which a series of trades are allowed to take place at
disequilibrium prices, believed he had shown that prices will eventually settle
at the price-taking equilibrium. However, the argument was not transparent.
The adjustment process involves moving from the initial endowment point
in a series of trades, where trading at ‘false’ prices is allowed at each step.
The process must conclude with both individuals at a point on the contract
curve. A feature of the process is the assumption that each stage or iteration
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Figure 4: Disequilibrium Trades
of the sequence involves Pareto improvements: individuals trade only if it
makes them better oﬀ. Furthermore, it involves trading at the ‘short end’ of
the market, that is, the minimum of supply and demand. This arises from
the impossibility of forcing any individual either to buy or sell more than
desired at any price.
An example of two disequilibrium trades is shown in Figure 4, where
the endowment moves from E to E1, and then to E2. With a price line
represented by EP, there is an excess supply of good X as person A tries
to reach the indiﬀerence curve U0
A and person B wishes to reach U0
B.T r a d e
takes place at E1, the short-end of the market. Point E1 then becomes the
new endowment point. At the second trading stage, the price of X must be
lowered to induce person B to purchase more. At a price represented by the
line E1P1 through the new endowment point, the excess supply is lower than





B respectively, it can be seen that E2 is a Pareto-improvement relative to
E1. It is also clear that person A is better oﬀ, the slower is the fall in the
price of X relative to Y at each stage.
The combination of Pareto-eﬃcient moves at each stage, combined with
25an adjustment process such that an excess supply leads to a price reduction,
and vice versa, produces a stable process that converges to an equilibrium
somewhere on the contract curve.7
The basic problem was that Marshall believed that his assumption of an
additive utility function, combined with the assumption that the marginal
utility of one good is constant for both individuals, guaranteed a determi-
nate price, if the good having constant marginal utility was money. Indeed,
this case was mentioned by Edgeworth (see 1925, ii, p.317, n.1). The con-
tract curve is a straight line parallel to the y axis (where this good is the one
with constant marginal utility), along which the rate of exchange is constant.
So the equilibrium price does not depend on the sequence of trades. How-
ever, Edgeworth’s point was that the total amount spent on good x remains
indeterminate.
There was a later, though much milder, disagreement between Marshall
and Edgeworth over the so-called Giﬀen good. In a book review, Edgeworth
argued that, ‘even the milder statement that the elasticity of demand for
wheat may be positive, though I know it is countenanced by high authority,
appears to me so contrary to a priori probability as to require very strong
evidence (1909, p.104). The ‘authority’ was of course Marshall (1890, p.132),
who replied directly to Edgeworth that, ‘I don’t want to argue ... But ... the
matter has not been taken quite at random’ (Pigou, 1925, p.438). Marshall
gave a numerical example involving a journey travelled by two methods,
where the distance travelled by the cheaper and slower method must increase
when its price increases.8
It has been mentioned that Edgeworth introduced the generalized utility
function. An implication is that it allows for complementarity, although
Edgeworth did not explicitly consider this in 1881. The ﬁrst formal deﬁnition
of complementarity is attributed to Auspitz and Lieben, and it was used by
Edgeworth in his paper on the pure theory of monopoly, and also by Pareto:
this amounts to what is now called ‘gross’ complementarity, deﬁned in terms
7This type of sequence of disequilibrium trades was later used by Launhardt; see Creedy
(1994b).
8For further details, see Creedy (1990).
26of cross-price elasticities. It is also sometimes referred to, using the initials
of the four people mentioned above, as ALEP complementarity.
The ﬁrst major criticism came from Johnson (1913), who pointed out that
the criterion was not invariant with respect to monotonic transformations of
the utility function. His treatment was extended by Hicks and Allen (1934),
so that the modern deﬁnition involves ‘net’ complements in terms of com-
pensated price changes. There is no symmetry between gross substitutes and
complements as only the matrix of (compensated) substitution elasticities is
assumed to be symmetric.
8.2 Monopoly and Oligopoly
In a paper ﬁrst published in Italian in 1897, and not translated until the
collected Papers (1925), Edgeworth examined several problems relating to
monopoly. He began his discussion with Cournot’s (1838) example of the
‘source minerale’ in which there are ‘two monopolists’ (that is, duopolists),
each owning a spring of mineral water. It would be natural for Edgeworth to
expect an indeterminate price in this ‘small numbers’ context. Cournot had
arrived at a determinate solution for price and output, but Edgeworth showed
that, ‘when two or more monopolists are dealing with competitive groups,
economic equilibrium is indeterminate’ (1925, p.116). The daily output from
each spring was assumed to be limited to identical ﬁxed amounts, delivery
costs were zero and all consumers had the same demand curve (purchasing
one unit only of output). Hence demand is n(1 − p) where n is the number
of customers and p is the price. Cournot’s solution was that the price would
be p =1 /4, but Edgeworth argued that one of the ‘monopolists’ had an
incentive to raise the price back to p =1 /2, which is the revenue maximising
price, so that there is not a determinate price. He argued that:
at every stage . . . it is competent to each monopolist to
deliberate whether it will pay him better to lower his price against
his rival as already described, or rather to raise it to a higher . .
. for that remainder of customers of which he cannot be deprived
b yh i sr i v a l ....L o n gb e f o r et h el o w e s tp o i n th a sb e e nr e a c h e d ,
27that alternative will have become more advantageous than the
course ﬁrst described’ (1925, p.120)
E d g e w o r t hw e n to nt os a y ,‘ t h em a t t e rm a yb ep u ti nac l e a r e rl i g h t ’ ,a n d
he then deﬁned what are now called the reaction curve and isoproﬁtl i n e s( i n
that order) for variations in prices. However, it was not until Bowley’s (1924)
discussion that these matters began to be presented in a more transparent
manner.
Edgeworth then considered the case of complementary demand within
the context of ‘bilateral monopoly’, where the two goods are demanded in
ﬁxed proportions for use in the production of a further article. An interesting
feature is that he wrote the equations of the reaction curves and explicitly
dealt with what are now called conjectural variations, reﬂecting the extent
to which one duopolist is expected to change price in response to changes
made by the second duopolist. In discussing this problem Edgeworth also
introduced the further important concept of the ‘saddle point’, which he
called the ‘Hog’s Back’, clearly indicating its importance for stability.
8.3 The No-proﬁt Entrepreneur
Walras (1874, p.225) had introduced the concept of the entrepreneur who
neither gains nor loses. This result applied only to the competitive equilib-
rium, where there are no incentives for entrepreneurs to enter any industry.
This does not of course mean that there are no proﬁts, in the accounting
sense, since the returns to homogeneous units of inputs of organization and
management services are subsumed in the costs of the ﬁrm.
Edgeworth’s criticisms of this concept of the no-proﬁt entrepreneur, re-
produced in his Papers (1925), recognized that with Walras’s assumptions
there was nothing illogical about the argument. The theory simply means
that nothing remains, ‘after the entrepreneur has paid a normal salary to
himself’ (1925, pp.26, 30). Furthermore, ‘if [the general expenses] are taken
into account, the argument becomes a fortiori. For why should not a substan-
tial remuneration for the entrepreneur be included in the general expenses
of the business’ (1925, ii, p.469). Edgeworth’s diﬀerence with Walras was
28to some extent ‘only verbal’, but he was also unhappy with the idea that
entrepreneurship is homogeneous and divisible.
8.4 The Theory of Taxation
In the 1890s Edgeworth produced two surveys of considerable importance.
These surveys, of the pure theory of taxation and of the pure theory of
international values, were both published in the Economic Journal and sub-
sequently reproduced (with alterations) in his Papers (1925, vol. ii). Each
survey consisted of three separate parts, and displayed a staggering breadth
of knowledge and command of the subject. They represent his most serious
attempts to produce any kind of synthesis of a branch of economic literature.
Edgeworth began his survey with the rather strong statement that, ‘the sci-
ence of taxation comprises two subjects to which the character of pure theory
may be ascribed; the laws of incidence, and the principle of equal sacriﬁce’
(1925, p.64). He then considered a variety of special cases and contexts of
tax incidenc. The basic framework for incidence analysis was the simple par-
tial equilibrium approach, still used in many basic textbooks, in which the
incidence depends on the relative values of supply and demand elasticities.
The basic approach to incidence analysis actually stemmed from the im-
portant paper by Jenkin (1871). It suggests that in general the price of the
taxed good will either remain constant (in the extreme case of inelastic sup-
ply) or will increase. However, this result ignores interrelationships among
commodities. Edgeworth showed that when such interrelationships are ex-
plicitly allowed, there are some circumstances in which the price of the taxed
good will actually fall. When discussing this ‘paradox’, Edgeworth repro-
d u c e dh i sa r g u m e n tw h i c hh a di nf a c tb e e ne x p l o r e di nm o r ed e t a i li nh i s
paper on monopoly, published in Italian in the same year, 1897. Edgeworth
ﬁrst stated his ‘tax paradox’ in the following terms:
when the supply of two or more correlated commodities — such
as the carriage of passengers by rail ﬁrst class or third class — is
in the hands of a single monopolist, a tax on one of the articles —
e.g. a percentage of ﬁrst class fares — may prove advantageous to
29the consumers as a whole. ... The fares for all the classes might
be reduced. (1925, p.139)
E d g e w o r t hr e g a r d e dt h i sr e s u l ta sa ne x a m p l eo fas i t u a t i o nw h e r e ,‘ t h e
abstract reasoning serves as a corrective to what has been called the "meta-
physical incumbus" of dogmatic laisser faire’ (1925, i, p.139; see also 1925, ii,
pp.93-4). Essentially the two commodities must be substitutes in consump-
tion and production, and the result is partly brought about by the fact that
the monopolist has an incentive to increase the supply of the untaxed com-
modity. Edgeworth also recognized that the result could occur in competitive
markets (see 1925, p.63). As with many of Edgeworth’s original results, this
tax paradox was not a subject of continuous development. Its main practical
importance perhaps arises from the fact that in the early 1930s it attracted
the attention of Hotelling (1932).9
The section of the taxation survey which attracted most immediate at-
tention was Edgeworth’s discussion of the various ‘sacriﬁce’ theories of the
distribution of the tax burden, and his qualiﬁed support for progressive tax-
ation. Edgeworth’s attitude to taxation was similar to that of the major
classical economists in that he rejected a beneﬁt approach, on the argument
that taxation is not an economic bargain governed by competition. Thus in
his view the problem was to determine, ‘the distribution of those taxes which
are applied to common purposes, the beneﬁts whereof cannot be allocated
to particular classes of citizens’ (1925, p.103). A principle of justice is thus
required. His approach can be seen as marking a crucial stage in the transi-
tion towards a ‘welfare economics’ view of public ﬁnance, rather than using
a special set of ‘tax maxims’ such as the famous criteria laid down by Adam
Smith.
Not surprisingly, Edgeworth (1925, p.102) argued along neo-contractarian
lines set down in Mathematical Psychics that the utilitarian arrangement
would be accepted by individuals uncertain of their own prospects and taking
an equal a priori view of the probabilities. He suggested that, ‘each party
may reﬂect that, in the long run of various cases ... of all the principles of
9For further discussion of the paradox, see Creedy (1988).
30distribution which would aﬀord him now a greater, now a smaller proportion
of the sum-total utility obtainable ... the principle that the collective utility
should be on each occasion a maximum is most likely to aﬀord the greatest
utility in the long run to him individually’. Having established the use of
utilitarianism as a principle of distribution justice, Edgeworth then succinctly
stated the main argument:
The condition that the total net utility procured by taxation
should be a maximum then reduces to the condition that the total
disutility should be a minimum ... it follows in general that the
marginal disutility incurred by each taxpayer should be the same.
(1925, p.103)
The implication is that if all individuals have the same cardinal utility
function, after-tax incomes would be equalized. Edgeworth also clearly recog-
nized that if there is considerable dispersion of pre-tax incomes relative to
the total amount of tax to be raised, where there is, ‘not enough tax to go
around’ (1925, ii, p.103), the equi-marginal condition cannot be fully satisﬁed
unless there is a ‘negative income tax’ which raises the incomes of the poorest
individuals to a common level. Thus, ‘the acme of socialism is for a moment
sighted’ (1925, p.104). But Edgeworth immediately considered the practi-
cal limitations to such high progressive taxation. The following quotation
illustrates one of Edgeworth’s favourite metaphors, his respect for Sidgwick,
his attitude to authority, his views on utilitarianism and the applicability of
pure theory, and of course his unmistakable style:
In this misty and precipitous region let us take Professor Sidg-
wick as our chief guide. He best has contemplated the crowning
height of the utilitarian ﬁrst principle, from which the steps of
a sublime deduction lead to the high tableland of equality; but
he also discerns the enormous interposing chasms which deter
practical wisdom from moving directly towards that ideal. (1925,
p.104)
31Among the various limitations, Edgeworth noted diﬀerences in individual
utility functions, population eﬀects, the disincentives to work, growth of
culture and knowledge, savings, and of course the problem of evasion.
8.5 International Trade
Edgeworth’s survey of the pure theory of international values was in some
ways responsible for a change of emphasis in the approach to trade theory,
despite the fact that it contained few original analytical contributions. In-
deed, he said that, ‘Mill’s exposition of the general theory is still unsurpassed’
(1925, p.20), and acknowledged further that, ‘what is written ... after a pe-
rusal of [Marshall’s] privately circulated chapters ... can make no claim to
originality’ (1925, p.46). Edgeworth saw trade theory as an application of
the general theory of exchange:
The fundamental principle of international trade is that gen-
eral theory ... the Theory of Exchange ... which ... constitutes
the ‘kernel’ of most of the chief problems in economics. It is a
corollary of the general theory that all the parties to a bargain
look to gain by it ... This is the generalised statement of the
theory of comparative cost. (1925, p.6)
Thus the gains from trade are analogous to the gains from exchange in
simple barter and, ‘It is useful ... to contemplate the theory of distribution
as analogous to that of international trade proper’ (1925, p.19). Hence trade
theory is to Edgeworth simply one more application of the general method of
Mathematical Psychics. In directly applying the theory of exchange to that
of trade, Edgeworth was quite content to use community indiﬀerence curves
without clearly specifying how aggregation might be carried out. He said
only that, ‘by combining properly the utility curves for all the individuals,
we obtain what may be called a collective utility curve’ (1925, p.293).
One of Edgeworth’s criticisms of Mill (1848) was that the latter took
as his measure of the gain from trade the change in the ratio of exchange
of exports against imports. Thus Mill in this case ‘confounds "ﬁnal" with
32integral utility’ (1925, p.22). The same point had in fact been made by
Jevons (1957, pp. 154-6). However, Edgeworth, while preferring total utility,
admitted that Mill was not otherwise led to serious error in using his own
measure.
Edgeworth’s survey was, as always, extremely wide ranging, though for
later developments the most interesting parts are concerned with his elu-
cidation of Mill’s ‘recognition of the case in which an impediment may be
beneﬁcial — or an improvement prejudicial — to one of the countries’ (1925,
p.9). These cases would now be discussed under the headings of the ‘optimal
tariﬀ’ and ‘immiserising growth’. In the case of an optimal tariﬀ,ac o u n t r y
acts as monopolist and imposes a price which enables that country to at-
tain its highest indiﬀerence curve, subject to the other country’s oﬀer curve.
However, this position is not on the contract curve. The detailed speciﬁca-
tion of the optimum tariﬀ in terms of elasticities had to wait until Bickerdike
(1906), Pigou (1908) and the later revivals of interest in the 1940s. Edge-
worth’s judgement of Bickerdike was th a th eh a d ,‘ a c c o m p l i s h e daw o n d e r f u l
feat. He has said something new about protection’ (1925, ii, p.344).
E d g e w o r t hc o u l dn o to fc o u r s eb ee x p e c t e dt os u p p o r tt h eu s eo fs u c h
tariﬀs in practice. He acknowledged the possibility of retaliation, but also:
For one nation to beneﬁti t s e l fa tt h ee x p e n s eo f. . .o t h e r si s
contrary to the highest morality ... But in an abstract study upon
the motion of projectiles in vacuo, I do not think it necessary to
enlarge upon the horrors of war. (1925, p.17, n. 5)
The ‘highest morality’ was, of course, the principal of utilitarianism.
9 Conclusions
It has been seen that Edgeworth did not begin working and writing in eco-
nomics until his mid thirties, but in common with the majority of neoclassical
economists he soon pursued an academic career as a professor of economics.
Indeed, in a period which saw the rapid and widespread professionalisation
33of the subject, Edgeworth held an academic position in England that was re-
garded as second only to that of Alfred Marshall. In spite of his wide range
of reading and sympathies, Edgeworth’s work was characterized by the fact
that it was virtually all addressed to his fellow professional economists. So
uncompromising was he in his view that economics is a very diﬃcult subject
oﬀering only remote and nearly always negative policy advice, that it may
fairly be said that his work was addressed to just a small number of ‘fellow
travellers’ in the rareﬁed atmosphere of the ‘higher regions’ of pure theory.
However, Edgeworth imposed no geographical limitations, and with his con-
siderable linguistic skills and international sympathies was in contact with
the majority of leading economists around the world.
The distinguishing feature of the neoclassical ‘revolution’ was its empha-
sis on exchange as the central economic problem. The success of this shift
of focus from production and distribution to exchange was closely associated
with the fact that it had as its foundation a model based on utility max-
imisation. This allowed for a deeper treatment of the gains from exchange
and the wider considerations of economic welfare. Schumpeter summarised
the point by stating that utility analysis must be understood in terms of
exchange as the central ‘pivot’ and ‘the whole of the organism of pure eco-
nomics thus ﬁnds itself uniﬁed in the light of a single principle’ (1954, p.913).
This is indeed the context in which Edgeworth’s work in economics must be
seen. Schumpeter’s remark is merely a more prosaic expression of Edge-
worth’s view quoted above that ‘"Méchanique Sociale" may one day take her
place along with "Méchanique Celeste", throned each upon the double-sided
hieght of one maximum principle’. The central theme of Edgeworth’s work
is also clear in his revealing statement, taken from his Presidential address
to Section F of the Royal Society, that:
It may be said that in pure economics there is only one fun-
damental theorem, but that is a very diﬃcult one: the theory of
bargain in a wide sense. (1925, ii, p.288)
This perspective helps the major thread which runs through all Edge-
worth’s work in economics to be seen. His earlier mathematical analysis of
34the implications of utilitarianism for the optimal distribution, before turn-
ing to economics, was not only highly original (and esoteric) but laid the
foundation for his work in economics. Thus, the transition from New and
Old Methods of Ethics to Mathematical Psychics was not a shift in major
preoccupations but rather a change of emphasis. Distribution was then seen
as an important concomitant of exchange, so that the analysis of contract
became for Edgeworth central. Edgeworth’s emphasis on the indeterminacy
(the inability of utility maximisation alone to determine the rate of exchange,
only a range of eﬃcient exchanges) which results from the existence of a small
number of traders led him to his pathbreaking analysis of the role of numbers
in competition, along with the eﬃciency properties of competitive equilibria.
The analysis of the utilitarian objective as an arbitration rule led Edge-
worth directly to his new ‘social contract’ argument in explaining the accep-
tance of utilitarianism as a principle of social justice. It was the realisation
of this new justiﬁcation of utilitarianism, using his newly developed analyt-
ical tools, which generated the excitement that is clearly evident in his ﬁrst
work in economics. While Mathematical Psychics developed the techniques
of indiﬀerence curves and the contract curve within the ‘Edgeworth box’ —
t o o l sw h i c ha r en o wu b i q u i t o u si ne c o n o m i ca n a l y s i s—E d g e w o r t hh i m s e l fw a s
c l e a r l yd r i v e nm a i n l yb yh i sa b i l i t yt ol i n kt h ea n a l y s i so fp r i v a t ec o n t r a c t si n
markets to that of a social contract in which utilitarianism is the ‘sovereign
principle’. The integration of his analysis of barter, and the eﬀects of the
introduction of additional traders into the market, with the demonstration
that the utilitarian arrangement prescribes a point on the contract curve of
eﬃcient exchanges and is acceptable to risk-averse traders, was to Edgeworth
nothing short of ‘momentous’.
The results are of course highly abstract. In discussing their ultimate
value suggested that:
Considerations so abstract it would of course be ridiculous to
ﬂing upon the ﬂood-tide of practical politics ... it is at a height
of abstraction in the rareﬁed atmosphere of speculation that the
secret springs of action take their rise, and a direction is imparted
35to the pure foundation of youthful enthusiasm whose inﬂuence
will ultimately aﬀect the broad current of events. (1881, p.128)
The intellectual pleasure derived from being able to draw together so
many diﬀerent subjects of analysis, and strands of his enormous range of
learning, is clearly evident. However, it is precisely this wide ﬁeld of vision,
combined with the technical level and idiosyncratic style of writing, which
made Mathematical Psychics so diﬃcult for his contemporaries, and which
continue to make the book seem so strange and yet so rewarding to the
modern reader.
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